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Abstract
Whether cross-border fi nancial market integration has raised global insurance, is still 
a controversial issue in the literature. If this is so, what should we observe in the data? 
The insurance literature emphasizes that effi cient risk-sharing requires fi nancial markets to 
channel resources to countries that have been made temporarily poorer by some negative 
conjuncture, net of physical capital accumulation. This standard condition, which provides 
the basis for virtually every test of international insurance, is however derived focusing 
on only one of the two channels of cross-border insurance, the fi nancial fl ows channel, 
implicitly assuming no interaction between this and the other channel, international relative 
price fl uctuations. 
This paper shows that testable conditions can only be derived theoretically placing the 
interaction between prices and fi nancial fl ows centerstage in the analysis. Using a two-
country general equilibrium model with endogenous portfolio diversifi cation, I show that 
fi nancial fl ows and relative prices can be either complements or substitutes in providing 
insurance. In the case of complementarity, fi nancial infl ows raise the international price 
of a country´s output. This implies the standard condition. In the case of substitutability 
prices and fl ows transfer purchasing power in opposite directions. This implies a different 
condition: effi cient fi nancial markets are required to channel resources «upstream», from 
relatively poorer to relatively richer countries. The conditions for substitutability appear to be 
quantitatively and empirically plausible.
Keywords: International fi nancial fl ows, risk-sharing, terms of trade.
JEL classifi cation: F3, F4, G1.
Resumen
La pregunta de si la integración internacional de los mercados fi nancieros ha aumentado la 
cobertura del riesgo a nivel global o no, sigue siendo un tema controvertido en la literatura. 
Si fuera así, ¿qué deberíamos observar en los datos? La literatura enfatiza que una 
diversifi cación efi ciente de riesgos requiere que los mercados fi nancieros canalicen recursos 
hacia los países que se han empobrecido temporalmente por alguna coyuntura negativa, 
neto de la acumulación de capital físico. Esta condición estándar, que proporciona la base 
para casi todos los test estadísticos de cobertura del riesgo en al ámbito internacional, ha 
sido derivada centrándose sólo en uno de los dos canales de diversifi cación internacional del 
riesgo, el canal de los fl ujos fi nancieros, asumiendo implícitamente que no hay interacción 
entre este y el otro canal, fl uctuaciones de precios relativos internacionales. 
Este trabajo muestra que sólo pueden deducirse teóricamente condiciones empíricamente 
contrastables colocando la interacción entre precios y fl ujos fi nancieros en el centro del 
análisis. Utilizando un modelo de equilibrio general con dos países y diversifi cación endógena 
de cartera, se muestra que fl ujos fi nancieros y precios relativos pueden ser complementos 
o sustitutos para proporcionar un seguro. En el caso de la complementariedad, los fl ujos 
fi nancieros incrementan el precio internacional de la producción de un país. Esto implica 
la condición estándar. En el caso de la sustituibilidad, precios y fl ujos transfi eren poder 
adquisitivo en direcciones opuestas. Esto implica una condición diferente: mercados 
fi nancieros efi cientes deberían canalizar los recursos desde los países relativamente más 
pobres a los relativamente más ricos. Las condiciones para la sustituibilidad parecen ser 
plausibles cuantitativa y empíricamente.
Palabras clave: Flujos fi nancieros internacionales, diversifi cación del riesgo, términos de 
intercambio.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decades, most restrictions to cross-border asset trade were removed. Finan-
cial integration increased dramatically the volume of activity in international financial
markets. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) document that foreign assets and liabilities
as a share of GDP increased by 250% among industrialized countries between 1970 and
2001. Cross-border financial flows due to external borrowing and portfolio returns rose
by 50-100% during the same period. Many of the macroeconomic consequences of these
stronger financial linkages still have to be fully evaluated. One of the crucial, still open
issues is whether these developments in international financial markets actually raised
global insurance.
As it is well-known, international financial markets may insure residents in different
countries against the effects of national business cycle shocks. Local disturbances (af-
fecting productivity, investment, government spending) may temporarily lower national
income. If international financial markets are efficient, households can shed their con-
sumption from national shocks by borrowing from abroad or by getting returns on their
portfolio of foreign assets. A large body of literature has investigated whether financial in-
tegration actually increased cross-border insurance against national income shocks. These
works have confronted with a basic theoretical issue: if international financial markets
have become more efficient in providing insurance, what should we observe in the data?
Several contributions proposed theoretical efficiency conditions for financial markets and
compared them with the data — with mixed results.
What this literature has typically ignored is that international trade in assets is not
the only channel of cross-border insurance. Also relative price fluctuations (terms of
trade movements) may hedge consumers against national income shocks. For instance,
consider a country hit by a fall in productivity that lowers the income of its residents.
If the international price of their output rises, residents can sell it at a higher price in
international good markets and recover some purchasing power. In this sense, relative
price fluctuations can transfer purchasing power across countries.1
The idea behind this paper is that global insurance results from the joint operations of
two channels — international financial markets (cross-border financial flows) and relative
price fluctuations. Its purpose is to reconsider the basic issue in the insurance literature
focusing precisely on the interaction between these two channels: how should we identify
efficient financial markets if financial flows and relative price fluctuations provide insurance
jointly?
The literature has suggested that well-functioning asset markets should channel re-
sources to countries that (absent asset trade) would have been made temporarily poorer
by national disturbances, net of physical capital accumulation. This condition provides
the basis for virtually every test of international insurance (Appendix A describes how
it has been brought to the data by several empirical methods). Yet, this “standard effi-
ciency condition” for financial markets has been derived focusing on only one of the two
channels of cross-border insurance, financial flows. Relative price fluctuations have been
typically ignored or treated as exogenous, at best they have been credited for giving rise
to valuation effects on foreign asset positions.2 Is the standard condition still valid if
1This idea has been formalized by Cole and Obstfeld (1991).
2The efficiency benchmark for financial markets has been derived in frameworks with an infinite elas-
ticity of substitution between commodities or with exogenous price fluctuations. One example is the
so-called intertemporal approach to the current account, typically based on one-good models or setups
in which terms of trade movements are treated as exogenous (see Razin (1993) and Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1994)). The same applies to more recent approaches to the current account theory (Ventura (2002)).
The few extensions of this theory to setups with traded and non-traded goods (in which price fluctuations
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prices and flows provide insurance jointly? This paper gives a negative answer. It shows
that endogenous feedbacks between prices and flows may require efficient asset markets
to channel resources “upstream”, from relatively poorer to relatively richer countries (net
of physical capital accumulation). Thus the condition of insurance that has been used so
far by the empirical literature on risk-sharing measurement, provides a partial and po-
tentially misleading picture of the optimal pattern of financial flows. Testable conditions
for cross-border insurance can only be derived placing the interaction between prices and
flows centerstage in the analysis.
To derive these results, I write a two-country two-good DSGE model. Countries are
inhabited by representative consumers and are specialized in the production of different
varieties. National supply shocks create income risk for the representative households.
The assumptions of product specialization and home bias in consumption guarantee that
relative price fluctuations transfer purchasing power across countries. I assume that fi-
nancial markets are efficient. Namely, I analyze the model under two different asset trade
regimes, trade in uncontingent bonds and trade in two equities, representing respectively
two functions through which asset markets may increase cross-border risk-sharing, con-
sumption smoothing (through external borrowing) and ex-ante hedging (through portfolio
diversification).3 In both cases, I assume no frictions in international asset trade: agents
optimize over their purchase of securities and have rational expectations; there are no
costs associated to trade in assets. By construction the cross-country financial flows aris-
ing in these setups, provide the highest possible degree of risk-sharing achievable through,
respectively, external borrowing and portfolio diversification. I use the model to study
to which country efficient financial markets channel resources after national shocks. The
first asset structure (trade in uncontingent bonds) allows to analyze the optimal pattern
of flows from external borrowing. The second one (trade in two equities) makes asset
markets effectively complete. I solve for optimal portfolios using the method of Devereux
and Sutherland (2006), and study financial flows from equity returns and the composition
of optimal portfolios.
The results show that the optimal pattern of financial flows depends crucially on the
interaction between the two channels of cross-border insurance.
Consider a country that is hit by a negative conjuncture and gets temporarily poorer
with respect to the rest of the world. The “standard efficiency condition” for financial
markets states that, once asset trade in introduced, efficient financial flows should channel
resources to this country, either through external borrowing or via returns on international
portfolios.
However, receiving an inflow from abroad typically changes the international price
of a country’s output. I show that price fluctuations and financial flows can be either
complements or substitutes in providing insurance. If an inflow from abroad raises the
relative price of a country’s output, the economy benefits twice from the transfer: both
financial flows and price adjustments channel purchasing power to its residents — prices and
flows are complements in providing insurance. Complementarity implies the “standard
condition”: financial markets are efficient if they channel resources to the relatively poorer
country (absent asset trade).
are partially endogenized) have not been used as efficiency benchmarks by the insurance literature. See
Viani (2010a) for a survey of empirical methods.
3As noted by Cole (1991), well-functioning financial markets play two roles. First, frictionless trade in
uncontingent bonds allows consumers to smooth the effects of national disturbances on their consumption
by borrowing and lending abroad. Second, frictionless trade in contingent assets allows households to form
portfolios that hedge them ex-ante against shocks.
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Yet, receiving an inflow from abroad may lower the international price of a country’s
output. In this case, while financial flows tend to channel purchasing power to this
economy, relative price fluctuations transfer purchasing power abroad — the two channels
of insurance are substitutes. Price swings are so strong that the net effect of an inflow is
to lower the purchasing power of the receiving country. In this case financial markets are
efficient if they transfer resources to the country that (absent asset trade) would have been
made relatively richer by the shock — “upstream”. Upstream flows raise global insurance
and welfare. Yet, they contradict the standard condition of efficiency employed in the
literature.
More specifically, if agents can trade only in uncontingent bonds, flows and prices
being complements or substitutes determines to which economy efficient asset markets
should channel resources through external borrowing, and the optimal cyclicality of the
current account. If consumers can trade in two equities, the same relationship shapes the
pattern of flows due to portfolio returns, and the composition of optimal portfolios. I also
analyze the implications of complementarity and substitutability for equity home bias.
It is important to notice that the effects of upstream flows and the conditions that
generate them are not new to the international literature. In our model the different price
response to financial flows depends on the relative strength of substitution and income
effect of price changes, which, in turn, hinges crucially on the value of the trade elasticity.
In particular, optimal upstream flows arise for a relatively low trade elasticity, around 0.5.
This value is in the range of macro estimates, as documented by Hooper et al. (2000).
Corsetti et al. (2008a) use US data to estimate the trade elasticity to be slightly below 0.5.
This low trade elasticity is essential for their open-macro model to match the empirical
evidence on the so-called Backus-Smith puzzle, the low correlation between relative cross-
country consumption and the real exchange rate observed in the data. In particular,
Corsetti et al. (2008a) show that a trade elasticity around 1/2 is precisely what allows to
reconcile standard international models, driven by business-cycle supply shocks, with the
empirical evidence on consumption-real exchange rate correlations.4
On the other hand, whether financial inflows appreciate or depreciate countries’ terms
of trade in the short-run is still a controversial issue. While most works have estimated the
impact of net foreign assets variations on relative prices in the long-run, Gagnon (1996)
quantifies the short-run impact, the one that is relevant for the issue at handle. He finds
that a deterioration in net foreign assets (which in the short-term can well correspond to
a worsening in the trade deficit and a financial inflow from abroad) is associated with an
impact depreciation of the terms of trade. These findings do not allow to draw conclusions
about the impact of cross-border flows on international prices. Yet, they show that the
data could indeed support the hypothesis of substitutability between flows and prices,
which is necessary for upstream flows to be optimal.
This paper is related to three strands of literature. First, contributions developing
theories of consumption smoothing and portfolio diversification (as Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1994) and Ventura (2000) on, respectively, the intertemporal and the new theory of the
current account). These approaches — mostly grounded in one-good or partial equilibrium
frameworks — abstract from any interaction between financial flows and price fluctuations,
and provide the theoretical basis for the “standard efficiency condition”.
Second, contributions studying the insurance properties of relative price adjustments.
Cole and Obstfeld (1991), the first ones to analyze this issue, abstract from financial
4An alternative would be a much higher trade elasticity (around 4, in line with estimates from the
trade literature) and very persistent productivity shocks in an economy with capital accumulation. See
Corsetti et al. (2008).
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markets. Corsetti et al. (2008a) show how standard open-macro models can be reconciled
with the Backus-Smith evidence. They study how the structure of financial markets affects
relative price fluctuations in a model with international trade in uncontingent bonds.
Finally, the empirical literature on risk-sharing measurement. Obstfeld (1993), Sorensen
and Yosha (1998), and Flood et al. (2008) are only some examples of contributions fo-
cusing on the direction of financial flows along the business cycle, and adopting empirical
methods based on the “standard condition”.
To my knowledge, this paper is the first one to study the interaction between financial
flows and price fluctuations and its relevance for the mechanism of cross-border insurance.
It is also the first one to relate the interplay between the two insurance channels to optimal
portfolio composition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a measure
of cross-border insurance from macro theory, which will be useful to study the effects of
national shocks and the direction of optimal financial flows. Section 3 describes the two-
country two-good DSGE model. Section 4 analyzes the model under Financial autarky,
to study the impact of national disturbances on the cross-border allocation absent asset
trade. Section 5 and 6 analyze the same model, respectively, under trade in uncontingent
bonds and trade in two equities, to study optimal financial flows from external borrowing
and portfolio returns. Section 7 presents some considerations on complementarity and
substitutability, while 8 draws some conclusions.
2 A measure of cross-border insurance
Assume the world consists of several countries, each inhabited by a representative agent.
Asset markets are complete as agents can trade internationally in a full set of Arrow-
Debreu securities. Focus on two countries, Home and Foreign. In what follows W (s|s)
denotes the price in state-of-the-world s of an Arrow-Debreu security paying 1 unit of
some numéraire good in the following period if state-of-the-world s realizes. UC (s) and
UC (s|s) are the marginal utilities of consumption of the H consumer, respectively, in
state s and in state s. P (s) and P (s|s) are the prices of the H consumption good in
state s and s. β denotes the discount factor of the H consumer, π (s|s) the conditional
probability of state s given s. The Euler Equation of the H consumer, regulating her
purchase in state s of Arrow-Debreu securities paying 1 unit of the numéraire in state s,
reads
UC (s)
W (s|s)
P (s)
= β · π (s|s) · UC (s|s) 1
P (s|s) ,∀s.s (1)
The H consumer buys securities until the marginal cost of purchasing one more asset (left
hand side in equation (1)) equals its expected marginal benefit (right hand side).
The analogous condition for the F agent is given by
UC (s)
W (s|s)
P  (s) · ω (s) = β
 · π (s|s) · UC (s|s)
1
P  (s|s) · ω (s|s) , ∀s, s (2)
where starred variables denote Foreign aggregates, and ω is the nominal exchange rate
between the H and the F currency.
Combining (1) and (2) gives
β
UC (s|s)
UC (s)
P (s)
P (s|s)!   "
m(s|s)
= β
UC (s|s)
UC (s)
P  (s)
P  (s|s)
ε (s)
ε (s|s)!   "
m(s|s)
=
W (s|s)
π (s|s) , ∀s, s
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where m (s|s) and m (s|s) are the Stochastic Discount Factors (SDFs) of the H and the
F consumer. Perfect cross-border risk-sharing against national income shocks (given by
construction by complete asset markets) equates the SDFs of the two agents, for every
states-of-the-world s and s.5 Equivalently, in terms of time-dependent notation, perfect
insurance implies
mt = m

t , ∀t (3)
On the contrary, if asset markets are not complete, Stochastic Discount Factors need
not be equalized. Uninsurable shocks will drive a wedge between them in some states-of-
the-world
mt = ηt ·mt , ∃t (4)
where ηt represents the wedge between H and F SDFs created by uninsurable disturbances.
Taking logarithms on both sides of (4) I define the measure of cross-border insurance, the
gap, as
gapt ≡ log (ηt)− log (1) = log (mt)− log (mt ) (5)
gapt measures the percentage deviation of the wedge between H and F SDFs observed at
time t from the wedge that would be observed if income risk was perfectly shared (η = 1).
In any model, the gap arising in response to national shocks measures by construction
the percentage deviation from the allocation corresponding to complete financial markets
and full insurance against national income shocks.6
In the next sections I will prove that the gap quantifies changes in countries’ relative
wealth created by uninsurable shocks. Namely, the sign of the gap indicates which country
has been made relatively richer (poorer) by national disturbances; its magnitude quantifies
the size of the change in countries’ relative wealth. Appendix B proves that in the DSGE
model used in this paper, the gap is a proxy for the social welfare losses due to the fraction
of country-specific risk that cannot be traded in financial markets. These properties make
the gap a useful instrument for the analysis of optimal financial flows. In particular, it
will be used to study the effects of national income shocks and the direction of financial
flows in the model detailed below.
3 A two-country two-good model
The model is a two-country two-good DSGE framework with endowment shocks and home
bias in consumption. Its core structure is the simplest one that allows to analyze, under
different asset trade regimes, the interaction between real and financial channels of shocks
transmission.7 Its simplicity allows to get analytical closed form solutions when trade in
more than one asset is introduced.
The model consists of two countries, Home and Foreign, each inhabited by a rep-
resentative household. Countries are specialized in the production of different goods.
Households in country H receive utility from consuming a bundle made up of the foreign
and the domestic good, according to a CES aggregator
5See also Backus and Smith (1993), Gravelle and Rees (2004), and Cochrane (2005).
6More precisely, the gap is an insurance measure in any model tha features a representative consumer
in each country.
7The model is closely related to frameworks employed in Cole and Obstfeld (1991), Kollmann (2006),
and Corsetti et al (2008).
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Ct =

(δ)1/θ (Cht)
θ−1
θ + (1− δ)1/θ (Cft)
θ−1
θ
 θ
θ−1
; θ > 0, δ > 1/2 (6)
where Cjt denotes consumption of the good produced in country j and δ is a parameter
capturing home bias in consumption. θ is the elasticity of substitution between H and
F-produced goods; in this model it coincides with the trade elasticity, i.e., the elasticity of
the import/export ratio with respect to relative price changes. The F consumption bundle
is analogously defined. Starred variables denote the corresponding quantities consumed
by Foreign agents. Goods are freely tradable but not storable. The period utility of both
agents depends on current consumption only and is a Constant Relative Risk Aversion
function with risk aversion coefficient ρ.
In each period H and F households receive a stochastic endowment according to the
process
log (Yjt) = ζ log (Yjt−1) + εjt
where Yjt denotes the endowment received by consumer j and εjt ∼ iid (0,σε). For
simplicity I assume Cov (εit, εjt) = 0 for i 
= j.
I assume that the law of one price holds and that the nominal exchange rate is constant
and equal to one for simplicity. Due to home bias in consumption purchasing power parity
does not hold outside a symmetric Steady State, and the two price indexes Pt and P t are
tied by the following condition defining the real exchange rate Qt
Qt ≡
P t
Pt
Terms of trade are defined as the ratio of the price of H imports and exports
tott ≡
Pft
Pht
where Pht, and Pft denote respectively the price of H and F-produced goods.
The relative value of F and H endowments can be written as
V t =
PftYft
PhtYht
Pt
P t
(7)
Standard cost minimization delivers H households’ demand for the H and the F variety
Cht = δ


Pht
Pt
−θ
Ct
Cft = (1− δ)


Pft
Pt
−θ
Ct
Analogous conditions hold for F agents. Good market clearing conditions read
Yht = Cht + C

ht
Yft = Cft + C

ft
The model is loglinearized around a symmetric Steady State in which endogenous
variables are constant and exogenous ones are equal to their mean values.
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In the following sections, I will analyze the model under different asset trade regimes.
Households’ budget constraints will be pinned down by the specific asset structure as-
sumed. More specifically, I will assume the existence of efficient financial markets that
allow agents to borrow from abroad or to diversify their portfolio. In these frameworks I
will simulate a national income shock and study the direction of optimal financial flows.
In all these exercises, the gap arising in the model in response to national disturbances
will be a useful instrument to study the effect of the shocks and the direction of financial
flows. For any possible asset structure, if the system is in Steady State up to time (t− 1),
the gap arising at time t in response to shocks is given by
gapt = qˆt − ρ (cˆt − cˆt )
where ρ is the common risk-aversion coefficient and lowercase hatted variables denote
percentage deviations from the Steady State.
As a first step, the next section analyzes the same model in Financial autarky to
study the effect of national income shocks on the cross-country allocation if international
financial markets were shut down.
4 Financial autarky and insurance from relative prices
In this section I analyze the model under Financial autarky, with two purposes. First, to
trace the effects of national disturbances on the cross-country allocation if there were no
financial markets. Second, to study insurance from relative price fluctuations.
As noted by Cole and Obstfeld (1991), if countries are specialized in the production of
heterogenous goods, they may be compensated for negative shocks reducing their output
by increases in the international price of their exports. Terms of trade volatility may
transfer purchasing power across countries and provide some automatic insurance against
national shocks.
Under Financial autarky relative price fluctuations represent the only channel of cross-
border insurance. Households have no means of smoothing consumption over time and
in each period their consumption must equal the value of their income. H and F budget
constraints read
CtPt = PhtYht
Ct P

t = PftYft
The relative value of F and H endowments, as defined in equation (7), can be written
in linearized form as8
vˆt = (yˆft − yˆht) + 2 (1− δ) totˆt
An exogenous rise in the H endowment represents (in relative terms) a negative income
shock for F consumers as it tends to decrease the relative value of the Foreign endowment,
vˆt . Price fluctuations can lessen or magnify this effect. If the terms of trade depreciate, F
8The relative value of endowments can be derived by substituting the solution for national CPIs
Pt =
?
δ (Pht)
η−1 + (1− δ)
?
Pft
?η−1? 1η−1
P t =
?
(1− δ) (Pht)η−1 + δ
?
Pft
?η−1? 1η−1
in consumers’ budget constraints.
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consumers are partially compensated by a rise in the international price of their output.
Price adjustments provide some automatic insurance to F agents by transferring them
some purchasing power, and limit the fall in vˆt . On the contrary, a terms of trade
appreciation would contribute to hurt F consumers, by reducing the international price
of their exports. In this case terms of trade fluctuations would magnify the fall in vˆt that
would have occurred at constant prices.
Following the shock, deviations of relative prices from the Steady State map into
deviations in relative consumption through their impact on relative income. The gap
arising in the model in response to the disturbance measures the deviation from full risk-
sharing created by the shock and quantifies the insurance properties of relative prices.
The response of the gap reflects also changes in the relative wealth of the two countries
created by the disturbance, as the following subsection shows.
4.1 Changes in relative wealth under Financial autarky
Agents’ intra-temporal decisions can be solved through standard expenditure minimiza-
tion. The inter-temporal problem of H consumers may be solved by setting up the La-
grangian
max
{Ct,χt}
. : L =
(Ct)
1−ρ
1− ρ + χt (PhtYht − PtCt) , ∀t
where χt is the multiplier attached to H agents’ budget constraint, and represents the
shadow value of current income, PhtYht. The first order condition with respect to con-
sumption reads
(Ct)
−ρ
= χtPt (8)
Its analogue for F consumers is given by
(Ct )
−ρ
= χtP

t (9)
where χt
 is the shadow value of F household’s current income.
Taking the ratio of (8) and (9) gives


Ct
Ct
−ρ
= Qt


χt
χt

Loglinearizing around the symmetric Steady State yields
qˆt − ρ (cˆt − cˆt ) ≡ gapt = (χˆt − χˆt )
The gap arising at time t in response to shocks reflects asymmetric responses of the shadow
value of current income in the two countries. Its sign indicates the new ranking of wealth:
if a shock raises more the shadow value of the F consumer’s income (makes him relatively
poorer), the gap is negative; positive if the disturbance makes the F agent relatively richer.
Thus the gap reflects the change with respect to the Steady State of the relative wealth
of F consumers.
4.2 Insurance from relative prices
From the expenditure minimization problem of F and H consumers, we get their demand
for, respectively, H and F-produced goods, which in their loglinearized version read
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1
θ
cˆht = (1− δ) totˆt +
1
θ
cˆ + qˆt (10)
1
θ
cˆft = −δtotˆt +
1
θ
cˆ (11)
Linearizing the Financial autarky budget constraints we can express Home and Foreign
consumption as
cˆt = (δ − 1) totˆt + yˆht (12)
cˆt = (1− δ) totˆt + yˆft (13)
Using the price indexes Pt and P t derived from the expenditure minimization, the
real exchange rate can be written as
qˆt = (2δ − 1) totˆt (14)
From the balance trade condition, the terms of trade are given by
totˆt = cˆ

ht − cˆft
Substitute for (10), (11), (12), (13), and (14) to get the response of the terms of trade to
shocks to the H and F endowments
totˆt =
1
1− 2δ (1− θ) · (yˆht − yˆft) (15)
Assume the system is in Steady State up to time (t− 1) and assume a national shock
at time t, an exogenous increase in the H endowment.
Combining the solution for the response to the shock of Home and Foreign consumption
and the real exchange rate, the gap arising at time t can be written as a function of the
deep parameters of the model as
gapFAt = qˆt − ρ (cˆt − cˆt ) = (16)
= − (2δρθ − ρ− 2δ + 1)
(2δθ − 2δ + 1) · εHt
where εHt is the i.i.d.. shock to the H endowment and the second line follows from
substituting (15) in (12), (13), and (14). There are two values of the trade elasticity θ for
which the terms in parentheses in equation (16) are equal to zero. These values define two
thresholds for the trade elasticity that play a crucial role in shaping the wealth imbalances
created by the shock.9
The first threshold is the value of θ for which the denominator in (16) is equal to zero
τ˜ ≡ 1− 1
2δ
I will refer to τ˜ as the transmission threshold, relating to the findings of Corsetti et al.
(2008a) who analyze the behaviour of the same model under Financial autarky. If the trade
elasticity is higher than τ˜ , an increase in the H endowment depreciates the terms of trade.
9The value of the trade elasticity is key in determining the equilibrium volatility of the terms of trade.
Therefore, analyzing transmission through relative price fluctuations in terms of the trade elasticity seems
a natural choice.
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Foreign consumers benefit from the rise in the international price of their output and the
bonanza in the H country raises consumption abroad — the international transmission of
shocks is positive. For an elasticity lower than τ˜ the same shock appreciates the terms of
trade. F consumers are hurt by a fall in the relative price of their output and the windfall
in the H country reduces consumption abroad — international transmission is negative.10
The second threshold is the value of θ for which the numerator in (16) is equal to zero
η˜ ≡ ρ+ 2δ − 1
2δρ
Since the gap is zero when θ = η˜, I call this value the efficiency threshold. If the trade
elasticity matches η˜, full risk-sharing is attained in response to the shock even in the
absence of financial markets.
I simulate a 1% positive shock to the H endowment at time t. The following graphs
show the time-t response of the terms of trade and the gap, both as a function of the
trade elasticity θ.11
10The reason why relative prices respond differently over the two regions of the elasticity domain is the
following. After the rise in the H endowment, world demand for the H good must increase, which requires
relative prices to adjust. Corsetti et al. (2008) show that a fall in the relative price of the H good tends, on
the one hand, to switch world expenditure towards the H variety, raising its demand (Pareto-Edgeworth
substitution effect ). On the other hand, the same fall in the H price lowers the value of the endowment
of H consumers. Since H households are the biggest buyers of the H variety, world demand for the H
commodity tends to fall (Pareto-Edgeworth income effect ). When θ < τ˜ the degree of substitutability
between goods is so low that the income effect prevails. For the H-good demand to increase, the income
of H consumers must rise, which requires an increase in the relative price of the H variety.
As in Corsetti et al. (2008) strong income effects might give rise to multiple equilibria. It should be
noted that this feature would not affect the main results of the analysis (see also the discussion in Corsetti
et al. (2002) and (2008)).
11 I assume δ = 0.9, β = (1/1.01), ρ = 2. The persistence of the shock does not influence the response
of the gap and the terms of trade under Financial autarky.
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FIGURE 1
Terms of trade response as a function of θ (Financial autarky)
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FIGURE 2
Gap response as a function of θ (Financial autarky)
If the two varieties were perfect substitutes (if the trade elasticity θ was infinite),
relative prices would not react to the shock and the rise in the H endowment would make
Foreign consumers relatively poorer. The gap arising in response to the disturbance — the
change in the relative wealth of F consumers with respect to the Steady State — would be
negative
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lim
θ→∞
gapFAt = lim
θ→∞
− (2δρθ − ρ− 2δ + 1)
(2δθ − 2δ + 1) = −ρ
As long as the two goods are not perfect substitutes, however, relative price fluctuations
transfer automatically purchasing power across countries. This can lead to a variety of
outcomes.
If the trade elasticity coincides with the efficiency threshold (θ = η˜), the shock raises
the international price of the F good (the terms of trade depreciate). F consumers benefit
from higher export prices. The extent of the depreciation is exactly sufficient to pool risk
efficiently and relative wealth is not affected by the shock: the gap is zero. As in Cole
and Obstfeld (1991), price fluctuations guarantee full risk-sharing even in the absence of
financial markets.12
gapFAt(θ=η˜) = −
(2δρη˜ − ρ− 2δ + 1)
(2δη˜ − 2δ + 1) · εHt = 0 ⇐⇒ χˆt = χˆ

t
If the trade elasticity is higher then the efficiency threshold (θ > η˜), the relative
price of the Foreign output rises in response to the shock, but due to the high degree of
substitutability between commodities, only a small depreciation is needed to clear the good
markets after the rise in the supply of the H good. Due to the insufficient terms of trade
volatility, price fluctuations do not transfer enough purchasing power to F consumers.
Their relative wealth falls with respect to the Steady State, as signaled by the negative
gap. From (16)
gapFAt < 0 ⇐⇒ χˆt < χˆt
For a trade elasticity lower than the efficiency threshold, still higher than the trans-
mission one (τ˜ < θ < η˜), the relatively low degree of substitutability between varieties
requires a strong depreciation of the terms of trade for good markets to absorb the excess
supply of the H good. Due to the strong rise in the relative price of the Foreign output,
the shock makes F consumers relatively richer (positive gap).
Finally, for a trade elasticity lower than the transmission threshold (θ < τ˜), the terms
of trade appreciate in equilibrium. Price movements enlarge the wedge between the rela-
tive value of endowments that would have aroused at given prices. F consumers are hurt
both by the relative fall in the quantity of their endowment and by the fall in the price
of their output, and are made relatively poorer by the disturbance.
4.3 The interaction between prices and flows
Absent financial markets, national shocks typically make the real allocation diverge from
the one corresponding to full risk-sharing. Local disturbances alter countries’ relative
wealth and cause aggregate welfare losses.13 If asset trade was introduced, to which
country should financial resources optimally flow after a national shock? As a first step
to answer this question, it is useful to study the interaction between cross-border flows
and price fluctuations. Proposition 1 describes how relative prices react to an exogenous
marginal flow of resources across countries in Financial autarky.14
12The efficiency threshold generalizes specific models used in other contributions. Cole and Obstfeld
(1991) assume a Cobb-Douglas consumption aggregator and no home bias: θ = 1 , δ = (1/2). The core
building block of the monetary model of Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) is based on log utility and unitary
trade elasticity, namely ρ = 1 and θ = 1. In both papers asset markets are shown to be redundant.
13Appendix B proves that the gap reflects aggregate welfare losses due to imperfect insurance.
14Appendix C shows the Proofs to all the Propositions.
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Proposition 1 A marginal flow of resources from the H to the F country raises the
price of the F output (depreciates the terms of trade) if the trade elasticity is above the
transmission threshold τ˜ — prices and flows are complements; lowers the price of the F
output otherwise — prices and flows are substitutes.
Figure 3 shows the response of the terms of trade to a marginal flow of resources to
Foreign consumers, as a function of the trade elasticity θ.
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FIGURE 3
Terms of trade response to a marginal flow to the F country
The different response of relative prices along the elasticity domain can be explained
as follows. Due to home bias in consumption, a flow of resources to F consumers raises
relative world demand for the Foreign good. Relative prices must adjust to reduce this
demand. As shown by Corsetti et al. (2008a), a rise in the price of the F good has a
twofold effect on its demand. The Pareto-Edgeworth substitution effect tends to shift
expenditure away from Foreign goods, lowering their demand. The Pareto-Edgeworth
income effect raises the value of the endowment of Foreign consumers, the biggest buyers
of the F good. The increase in their purchasing power tends to raise world demand for
the F variety. For θ < τ˜ , the income effect prevails.15 In this case, reducing the demand
for the Foreign good requires lowering the income of its biggest buyers, F consumers. The
relative price of the F variety must fall in equilibrium.
Thus the threshold τ˜ defines two areas of the trade elasticity domain, which correspond
to different kinds of interactions between prices and flows. For θ > τ˜ receiving resources
from abroad raises the price of a country’s output on impact: both flows of resources and
price fluctuations transfer purchasing power to F consumers — the insurance channels are
complements. For θ < τ˜ , when resources flow to the F country, price fluctuations tend to
transfer purchasing power abroad — prices and flows are substitutes.
Proposition 2 describes how relative price fluctuations created by cross-border flows
affect, in turn, the relative wealth of the two countries.
15 See Corsetti et al. (2008) for a formal analysis of the relative strength of Pareto-Edgeworth substi-
tution and income effect in the same model.
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Proposition 2 A marginal flow of resources from the H to the F country raises the rela-
tive wealth of Foreign consumers if the trade elasticity is above the transmission threshold
τ˜ (if prices and flows are complements); lowers the relative wealth of F consumers oth-
erwise (if prices and flows are substitutes).
The first statement is not surprising. When flows and prices are complements, F
consumers benefit twice from an inflow of resources from abroad as the relative price of
their exports rises. Thus the inflow increases their relative wealth.
The second statement is less obvious. When flows and prices are substitutes, they
channel purchasing power in opposite directions and the net effect of a transfer on coun-
tries’ wealth is in principle ambiguous. Proposition 2 shows that the low trade elasticity
associated with substitutability, generates a high volatility of the terms of trade in response
to a marginal transfer. The negative effect of price fluctuations on Foreign consumers’
wealth prevails over the positive impact of the flow itself. Thus a transfer from abroad
lowers the relative wealth of the receiving country.
5 Efficient financial flows from external borrowing
Given the interaction between cross-border flows of resources and price fluctuations, how
should efficient financial markets be identified?
As noted by Cole (1991), well-functioning financial markets play two roles. First,
frictionless trade in uncontingent bonds allows consumers to smooth the effects of national
disturbances on their consumption by borrowing and lending abroad. Second, frictionless
trade in contingent assets allows households to form a portfolio that can hedge them
ex-ante against shocks.
In this and the next section I analyze the model under two different asset trade regimes,
representing respectively the two functions of efficient financial markets, consumption
smoothing (through external borrowing) and ex-ante hedging (through portfolio diver-
sification). In both cases, I assume no frictions in international asset trade: agents are
allowed to optimize over their purchase of securities and have rational expectations; there
are no costs associated to asset trade. In both setups, price fluctuations and financial
flows will transfer purchasing power across countries. Given the interaction between flows
and prices, I will study to which economy efficient financial markets — allowing consumers
to borrow from abroad or to diversify their portfolio — channel resources after national
shocks.
This section studies optimal financial flows from external borrowing. Consider the
model presented in section 3 under the following asset trade regime: agents can trade
in uncontingent bonds paying 1 unit of the H consumption bundle in every state-of-the-
world.16 The budget constraint of H consumers reads
PBt Bt+1 =
PhtYht
Pt
− Ct +Bt (17)
16 Self-insurance is typically defined as saving and borrowing activities carried out through a risk-free
asset. In a two-good model that allows for deviations from purchasing power parity every asset, even
an uncontingent one, bears some riskiness as endogenous price movements tend to alter its real returns.
However when the model is approximated to the first order, the expected returns on all assets are equalized.
Choosing a symmetric Steady State with a zero bond position as the approximation point, is sufficient
to ensure that asset returns do not transfer resources across countries in response to shocks. In terms of
allocation and dynamics of the model, it does not matter which particular uncontingent asset we assume
to be used to self-insure. Hence, the assumption that the bond pays in unit of the H consumption bundle
is unconsequential for the results.
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where Bt+1 denotes bonds purchased in period t, PBt their unitary price in terms of the
H consumption bundle. Bonds are assumed to be in zero net supply. H households’
inter-temporal problem is given by
max
{Ct,Bt+1,νt}
. : L = E0

∞
t=0
βt

(Ct)
1−ρ
1− ρ + νt

PhtYht + PtBt − CtPt − PBt PtBt+1


(18)
H agent’s first order conditions read
(Ct)
−ρ
= νtPt (19)
PBt = βEt

νt+1
νt
Pt+1
Pt

(20)
Combining (19) and (20) with their analogues for the F consumer and loglinearizing gives
−ρEt {cˆt+1}+ ρcˆt = −ρEt

cˆt+1

− Et

qˆt+1

+ ρcˆt + qˆ

t
Assuming that at time t the system is in a symmetric Steady State with zero bond holdings
yields
Et

qˆt+1 − ρ

cˆt+1 − cˆt+1

= Et {gapt+1} = 0
The possibility of self-insuring drives to zero the expected risk-sharing inefficiency by
equating the expected Stochastic Discount Factors of the representative agents.
The following Proposition describes optimal financial flows from external borrowing
Proposition 3 If flows and prices are complements, in response to national shocks effi-
cient financial markets channel resources through external borrowing to the country that
(absent asset trade) would have been made relatively poorer by the disturbance (“stan-
dard efficiency condition”). If flows and prices are substitutes, efficient financial markets
transfer resources to the country that (absent asset trade) would have been made relatively
richer by the shock.
Figure 4 gives a graphical representation. I simulate a 1% increase in the H endowment
at time t. The graph plots the time-t response of the Financial autarky gap (the relative
wealth of F consumers absent asset trade) and F agents borrowing, −bˆt (the inflow of
financial resources received by F consumers), both as a function of the trade elasticity
θ.17
17 I assume a persistent but temporary shock with autoregressive parameter ζ = 0.95. The model
with trade in uncontigent bonds is non-stationary because of the unit root in wealth accumulation. This
feature does not have any bearings for the main results of the analysis. Indeed, it is easy to verify that
Proposition 3 holds in the same model with stationarity-inducing features à la Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2003) (e.g. an endogenous discount factor).
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FIGURE 4
Response of the Financial autarky gap and
F current account deficit as a function of θ
If the trade elasticity is higher than the efficiency threshold η˜, absent financial mar-
kets a temporary bonanza in the H country would have made F consumers relatively
poorer; once we introduce efficient external borrowing, F households import resources
from abroad. If the trade elasticity is in between the two thresholds (τ˜ < θ < η˜), due
to the high terms of trade volatility F consumers would have been relatively richer un-
der Financial autarky; once we allow for asset trade, financial flows channel resources
to the H country. Thus in the region of the elasticity domain in which prices and flows
are complements, in response to the shock efficient financial markets channel resources
to the country that, absent asset trade, would have been made relatively poorer by the
disturbance. Flows from external borrowing are consistent with the predictions of the
“standard efficiency condition” for financial markets.18
On the contrary, in the area of the elasticity domain in which prices and flows are
substitutes, efficient financial markets transfer resources “upstream”, to the country that
(absent asset trade) would have been relatively richer. Under Financial autarky, F con-
sumers would have been hurt both by the relative fall in the quantity of their endowment
and by the fall in the price of their output; once we introduce asset trade, F households ex-
port resources.19 These flows from external borrowing are optimal by construction: they
are the best possible transactions occurring in a decentralized equilibrium with borrowing
and lending, since I assumed no restrictions, frictions or costs for international asset trade.
Yet, these flows contradict the predictions of the “standard efficiency condition”.
Upstream flows can be explained as follows. Focus on the region of the trade elasticity
domain in which prices and flows are substitutes. Proposition 1 states that for θ <
τ˜ a marginal flow of resources to the F country would lower the price of the Foreign
18Notice that the current account is procyclical.
19The current account is countercyclical.
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commodity, moving the terms of trade against F consumers. Proposition 2 shows that if
the F country — the one that would be relatively poorer absent asset trade — imported
resources from abroad, relative prices would move substantially against it due to the low
trade elasticity. Importing resources from abroad would lower so much the relative price of
the F commodity that it would reduce the relative wealth of Foreign consumers. Therefore,
efficient financial markets must transfer resources to the H country — upstream.20
5.1 External borrowing and equilibrium wealth imbalances
The previous section has derived a simple rule relating the financial flows we should observe
if financial markets were efficient and countries’ relative wealth absent asset trade. Here
I study the relationship between efficient financial flows and realized wealth imbalances.
If financial markets are efficient can we observe a temporarily richer country borrowing?
First, notice that the gap arising in equilibrium in the model with trade in uncontingent
bonds, reflects the change in countries’ relative wealth created by national shocks. To
see this consider the inter-temporal problem described in equation (18). The Lagrange
multiplier vt represents the shadow value of time-t income. The income received at time
t (minus current consumption), in turn, equals the present discounted value of wealth
(PhtYt +BtPt − PtCt) =
∞
j=1
j−1
i=0
PBt+j [Pt+jCt+j − Ph,t+jYt+j ] ≡ PDV wealth
Hence, νt is the shadow value of wealth at time t. Combining H agent’s first order con-
dition with respect to consumption (equation (19)) with its analogue for the F consumer,
and loglinearizing around the symmetric Steady State with zero bond holdings gives
qˆt − ρ (cˆt − cˆt ) ≡ gapSMt = (νˆt − νˆt ) (21)
The gap arising in the smoothing economy, gapSMt , reflects asymmetric responses in the
shadow value of wealth in the two countries.
In terms of the deep parameters of the model, gapSMt arising in response to an increase
in the H endowment can be written as
gapSMt = −


β − 1
ζβ − 1

·


2δρθ − 2δ − ρ+ 1
2δθ − 2δ + 1

· εHt =


β − 1
ζβ − 1

!   "
>0
· gapFAt (22)
where ζ and β denote respectively the persistence of the disturbance and households’
discount factor. Setting the risk-sharing inefficiency to zero in expectations, which is the
result of self-insurance, leaves it exposed to unexpected i.i.d. shocks. The gap arising
in equilibrium in the smoothing economy has the same sign as the one that would have
aroused after the same shock under Financial autarky.21
Proposition 3 then implies that we could observe a relatively richer country optimally
borrowing from a relatively poorer one — financial resources optimally flowing upstream.
20Propositions 1 and 2 defining complementarity and substitutability are proved in the model under
Financial autarky. It is important to notice that the relationship tying marginal flows of resources and
price fluctuations, is preserved in the model with trade in uncontingent bonds. Propositions 7 and 8 in
Appendix C give a formal proof.
21Exceptions may arise if households’ discount factor β is endogenized or if the shock process is non-
stationary. See Corsetti et al. (2008) for an example with trade in bonds in which the shock increases
the endowment over time, reaching a higher permanent long-run level.
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The following figure illustrates this point graphically by plotting the response to a 1%
temporary rise in the H endowment, of gapSM (the change in the relative wealth of
Foreign consumers created by the shock) and F agents’ current account deficit, both as a
function of the trade elasticity θ
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FIGURE 5
Response of the Smoothing gap and
F current account deficit as a function of θ
If the trade elasticity is lower than the transmission threshold τ˜ , we could observe a
relatively poorer country, F, lending abroad.
Notice that in this setup the optimality of upstream financial flows and the counter-
cyclicality of the current account are not due to a higher productivity in the temporarily
richer country, as happens, for instance, in the standard Backus-Kehoe-Kydland type of
models.22 As explained in the previous subsection, the optimality of upstream flows is
rather due to the particular kind of interaction between financial flows and price fluctua-
tions.
Notice also that the so-called intertemporal approach to the current account (one of the
theories at the basis of the “standard efficiency condition” for financial markets) developed
traditionally in one-good or partial equilibrium settings, can be recasted as a special case
within our framework. It is characterized by an infinite trade elasticity, which rules out
any interaction between terms of trade adjustments and financial flows. The allocation
it delivers would be on the far right in Figure 5: the country going through a temporary
negative conjuncture would be poorer and borrowing from abroad in equilibrium.
5.2 External borrowing and welfare
Appendix B proves that in this model, under any asset trade regime, the gap is a measure
of the social welfare losses due to imperfect insurance. The higher the welfare losses
created by uninsurable shocks, the higher the gap arising in response to the disturbances.
22 See Backus et al. (1995).
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From equation (22) it is easy to verify that the equilibrium smoothing gap is lower than
the gap that would have aroused after the same shock under Financial autarky.23 Thus
the cross-border flows created by external borrowing provide insurance against shocks,
containing cross-country wealth divergences and reducing the welfare losses created by
national disturbances.
Figure 6 compares the response to the same shock (a 1% increase in the H endow-
ment) of the gap arising under Financial autarky and under trade in uncontingent bonds.
Financial flows from external borrowing are beneficial even if they run upstream, as they
increase cross-border insurance and reduce the welfare losses created by the shock, with
respect to the ones that would have aroused absent asset trade (gapSM < gapFA also for
θ < τ˜ , corresponding to upstream flows).
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Response of the Financial autarky and
the Smoothing gap as a function of θ
6 Efficient financial flows from portfolio returns
In this section I analyze the model presented in section 3 under a different asset trade
regime, representing the second function of efficient financial markets — ex-ante hedging
through portfolio diversification. In particular, I choose an asset structure that allows
agents to be fully insured against national shocks: assets markets are effectively complete
by construction. As for the smoothing case, I assume no frictions in international asset
trade. Given the interaction between flows and prices, I study to which economy efficient
financial flows from portfolio returns channel resources in response to shocks.
Assume households can trade in two equities, H and F, representing respectively a
claim to the H and F country’s endowment. As we will verify in the next subsection, asset
23Again, exceptions may arise if households’ discount factor β is endogenized or if the shock process is
non-stationary.
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markets are effectively complete.24 The total quantity of each equity is normalized to 1.
Sh, Sf , S∗h, and S
∗
f denote the fraction of H and F equities owned respectively by H and
F consumers. Due to the normalization, the owner of Sh equities receives a share Sh of
the H endowment. Equities real returns, expressed in terms of the H consumption good,
are given by
Rt =
(Pht/Pt)Yht + Zt
Zt−1
R∗t =
(Pft/Pt)Yft + Z
∗
t
Z∗t−1
where Z and Z∗denote the real price (in terms of the H consumption bundle) of the two
assets.
The budget constraint of H households reads
NFAt = NFAt−1 +
YhtPht
Pt
− Ct +Rt · (Sht − 1) +R∗tSft
where NFAt ≡ [(Sh,t+1 − 1) · Zt + Sf,t+1 · Z∗t ] denotes H net foreign assets.
Euler equations and asset market clearing conditions are given by
(Ct)
−ρ = βEt

(Ct+1)
−ρ ·Rt+1

= βEt

(Ct+1)
−ρ ·R∗t+1

(23)
(Ct )
−ρ
Qt
= βEt

Ct+1
−ρ
Qt+1
·Rt+1

= βEt

Ct+1
−ρ
Qt+1
·R∗t+1

(24)
Sh,t + S

h,t = 1
Sf,t + S

f,t = 1
The model is loglinearized around a symmetric Steady State with NFA = NFA =
0.25 H consumers’ budget constraint can be written as
nfat =


1
β

nfat−1 + (δ − 1)tott + yˆht − cˆt +rxtα! "
ξt
(25)
where rxt = rˆt− rˆt is the percentage deviation of the realized return differential between
H and F equities from its Steady State value. α denotes H agents’ gross holdings of the
H equity in Steady State. In response to shocks, excess returns rx deviate from their
Steady State value and, combined with asset holdings α, deliver a transfer of resources
in consumers’ budget constraints. ξt in equation (25) denotes the financial flows from
portfolio returns received by H consumers.
I find it convenient to derive a solution for the model using the method developed by
Devereux and Sutherland (2006) — DS henceforth — to solve DSGE models with endoge-
nous portfolio choice. Applying this method allows to study in detail how the interaction
24Also Kollmann (2006) proves that trade in two equities makes asset markets effectively complete in
this model.
25Even if Steady State net foreign assets are zero, agents may hold a non-zero gross position. Therefore,
they can receive flows of resources from the returns on their gross holdings in response to shocks.
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between flows and prices determines (a) the direction of optimal financial flows via port-
folio returns and (b) the composition of optimal portfolios.26
DS show that in a first-order approximation optimal portfolio choice can be decom-
posed in two steps.27 The first step consists in solving the system linearized to the
first order treating realized portfolio resource transfers (ξ), as exogenous disturbances.28
Combine the Euler equations (23) and (24) linearized to the first order and assume that
at time t the system is in a symmetric Steady State to get
Et

qˆt+1 − ρ

cˆt+1 − cˆt+1

= 0⇒ Et {gapt+1} = 0
The solution to this step delivers the same allocation that would arise if agents could only
trade in uncontingent bonds.29
The second step is based on the macro dynamics of the first-order solution, and
amounts to recover optimal asset holdings α as those satisfying second-order optimality
conditions for portfolio choice.30 Taking a second-order approximation of the H and F
Euler equations and combining them, DS show that the optimal portfolio must satisfy the
following condition
Covt

qˆt+1 − ρ

cˆt+1 − cˆt+1

, rxˆt+1

= 0
Translating this equation in our framework, it is easy to see that it implies
Covt {gapt+1, rxˆt+1} = 0
The wealth asymmetry residual from smoothing decisions can be lowered exploiting move-
ments in asset excess returns. Agents adjust the composition of their portfolio until co-
movements between excess returns and (endogenous) wealth asymmetries are driven to
zero in equilibrium.
Having recovered the optimal portfolio through the second step, the final solution to
the system is
⎡
⎣
qˆt
cˆt
cˆt
⎤
⎦ =

A
 ·

yˆht
yˆft

!   "
smoothing allocation
+

B
 ·

εt
εt

!   "
portfolio returns
(26)
26 Since asset markets are effectively complete, in principle I could solve for the Pareto optimal real
allocation independently of asset holdings, and retrieve portfolios ex-post, as the ones that replicate a
Social Planner solution to the model. However, by using the DS method we can provide an explanation
for the direction of optimal flows (in Proposition 5). We are also able to provide a rationale for the
composition of optimal portfolios (detailed in the Proof to Proposition 6).
27Although applying the DS algorithm to a first order approximation of the model allows to retrieve
only the Steady State portfolio (and not its dynamic response to shocks), characterizing the time-invariant
asset holdings that arise in a world of infinitesimally small noise is sufficient to analyse the first order
dynamics of the macro variables of the system.
28 In a first order approximation the expected returns on all assets are equalized: the expected return
differential is zero. Therefore, ?rxtα, the transfer delivered by the Steady State portfolio in response
to shocks, can be treated as a mean-zero i.i.d. random variable (ξ) and included in the system as an
exogenous disturbance with these characteristics.
29Crucial to this identification is the fact that the system in this section and in the previous one is
linearized around the same approximation point, corresponding to zero net foreign assets.
Notice that in the allocation resulting from this step (which is only a partial solution to the system),
households can invest in assets but do not receive any transfer from their returns after national distur-
bances (ξ is exogenous and not responding to endowment shocks). Thus portfolio composition cannot be
exploited to hedge against shocks. Intuitively, what drives households decisions is the desire to smooth
over time the effect of national shocks on consumption.
30A second-order approximation is needed because assets yield equal expected returns in a first order
approximation. Optimal portfolios would then be indeterminate.
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Matrix A is the solution to the first step. It describes what would be the impact of
national shocks on endogenous variables if agents could only trade in uncontingent bonds,
pinning down dynamics that coincide with the smoothing ones. Matrix B, instead, results
from the solution to the second step of the DS method. It traces the dynamics given only
by resource flows generated by the optimal portfolios. Analogously we can write
gapt =

C
 ·

yˆht
yˆft

!   "
smoothing allocation
+

D
 ·

εt
εt

!   "
portfolio returns
(27)
where matrices C and D result from combining the appropriate rows of A and B in (26).
The gap arising in equilibrium in response to shocks can be decomposed in two parts.
The first one corresponds to gapSM , the gap that would arise if agents could only smooth
consumption by varying their net foreign assets. The second part reflects the variations
in relative wealth due to optimal portfolio returns. The DS method shows that we can
rationalize optimal portfolio returns as those able to counterbalance the smoothing gap
(the one resulting from the first part of the system), so as to reduce the equilibrium gap
to zero.
6.1 Insurance from portfolio flows
Appendix D proves that when consumers can trade in contingent assets, the gap arising
in equilibrium in response to shocks (the solution to the full system (26)) reflects changes
in relative countries’ wealth created by the disturbances. Clearly, these wealth imbalances
are residual after portfolio returns have transferred resources across countries.
If asset markets are effectively complete, national shocks should not create any risk-
sharing inefficiency, wealth asymmetry, and, in this model, welfare losses: the equilibrium
gap should always be zero. The following figure shows that the asset structure we have
assumed in this section effectively completes the market. The picture compares the gap
arising after a 1% increase in the H endowment in Financial autarky, in the one-bond
economy, and under trade in two equities. In the latter case, financial flows from portfolio
holdings provide full insurance against national shocks. This happens over the whole
elasticity domain, including the region in which flows and prices are substitutes (θ < τ˜).
In this area of the elasticity domain optimal portfolio returns channel resources upstream,
as shown in the next subsection.
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6.2 The direction of optimal flows
From the solution to the full system (26), it is easy to prove the following Proposition
Proposition 4 If flows and prices are complements, in response to national shocks ef-
ficient financial markets channel resources through portfolio returns to the country that
(absent asset trade) would have been made relatively poorer by the disturbance (“stan-
dard efficiency condition”). If flows and prices are substitutes, efficient financial markets
transfer resources to the country that (absent asset trade) would have been made relatively
richer by the shock.
Figure 8 illustrates this result. I simulate a 1% increase in the H endowment at time
t. The graph plots the time-t response of the Financial autarky gap (the relative wealth
of F consumers absent asset trade) and the portfolio returns received by F households,
ξt (the inflow of financial resources received by F consumers), both as a function of the
trade elasticity θ.31
31 I assume the shock process has an autoregressive parameter ζ = 0.95.
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As it happens in the case of external borrowing, in the area of the elasticity domain
in which prices and flows are substitutes, efficient financial markets transfer resources
upstream through portfolio returns, to the country that (absent asset trade) would have
been relatively richer. Notice that the flows from portfolio returns are optimal by con-
struction: they are the best possible transfers arising in a decentralized equilibrium with
portfolio diversification, since I assumed no restrictions, frictions or costs for international
asset trade, and an asset structure that delivers full risk-sharing. But clearly these flows
run against the predictions of the “standard efficiency condition” for financial markets.
The following Proposition, based on the first step of the DS method, shows that the
intuition for optimal upstream flows is the same outlined for the smoothing case. The
decomposition in (27) suggests that we can rationalize optimal portfolio flows as those
able to counterbalance the smoothing gap (the one resulting from the first part of the
system), so as to reduce the equilibrium gap to zero. Proposition 5 shows that a marginal
portfolio flow has a different impact on the smoothing gap depending on whether flows
and prices are complements or substitutes.
Proposition 5 Receiving a marginal transfer of resources through portfolio returns raises
the relative wealth of Foreign consumers absent portfolio flows (the smoothing gap) if and
only if the trade elasticity is above the transmission threshold τ˜ , that is if and only if
prices and flows are complements.
As it happens for the smoothing case, the different response of relative prices to in-
ternational transfers (here, the position of the trade elasticity relative to the transmission
threshold) is what determines the direction of optimal financial flows.
6.3 The composition of optimal portfolios
Proposition 6 shows that the interaction between price fluctuations and financial flows
has also important implications for the composition of optimal portfolios.
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Proposition 6 If flows and prices are substitutes, optimal portfolios exhibit home bias; if
flows and prices are complements, optimal portfolios may exhibit home bias, “excessive”
home bias, or foreign bias.
Figure 9 represents the share of Home equities held in Steady State by H consumers
as a function of the trade elasticity θ. A degree of home bias in equities consistent with
the empirical evidence, is compatible with efficient financial markets if prices and flows
are substitutes. Complementarity instead is not necessarily consistent with optimal home
bias.32
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H consumers’ share of the H equity, as a function of θ
7 Some remarks on complementarity and substitutabil-
ity
This paper has shown that efficient financial markets can make resources flow from rela-
tively poorer to relatively richer countries. These flows reduce the risk-sharing inefficiency
created by national shocks. Even though upstream flows run against the “standard ef-
ficiency condition” for financial markets, their effects and the conditions that generate
them are not new to the international literature.
In our model the interaction between flows and prices, which determines the optimal
direction of financial flows, has been shown to depend crucially on the trade elasticity. In
particular, optimal upstream flows arise for a relatively low trade elasticity, around 0.5.
In the empirical literature, there is uncertainty regarding the value of this parameter. For
G-7 countries estimates based on aggregate time series data range between 0.1 to 2, as
documented by Hooper et al. (2000). Corsetti et al. (2008a) use US data to estimate the
trade elasticity to be slightly below 0.5 — a value consistent with the existence of optimal
upstream flows. Corsetti et al. (2008a) showed that this low trade elasticity is precisely
what allows to reconcile standard international models, driven by business-cycle supply
shocks, with the empirical evidence on consumption-real exchange rate correlations.
32The Proof to Proposition 6 uses the two steps of the DS method to provide a rationale for the
composition of optimal portfolios in this model.
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On the other hand, whether financial inflows appreciate or depreciate countries’ terms
of trade in the short-run is still a controversial issue. Several contributions have inves-
tigated directly the interaction between international wealth transfers and price fluctua-
tions. While most works dealing with the so-called “transfer problem” have estimated the
impact of net foreign assets variations on relative prices in the long-run, Gagnon (1996)
quantifies the short-run impact, the one that is relevant for the issue at handle.33 34 Using
panel data for 20 industrial countries for the period 1973-1995, this paper finds that a
deterioration in net foreign assets is associated with an impact depreciation of the terms
of trade. Notice that, contrary to the log-run interpretation, in the short-run a decumu-
lation of net foreign assets can well correspond to a worsening in the trade deficit and a
financial inflow from abroad.35 Although these findings do not allow to draw conclusions
about the impact of cross-border financial flows on international prices, they show that
the data could support the hypothesis of substitutability between flows and prices, which
is necessary for optimal upstream flows.
The model considered in this paper abstracts from capital accumulation. As it is
well-known, cross-border asset trade may play two roles: it can insure residents in differ-
ent countries against national income shocks, and it can transfer physical capital across
countries towards its most productive destination. Tests of international risk-sharing
are clearly focused on the former function of financial markets, and the “standard ef-
ficiency condition” is typically formulated net of physical capital accumulation. This
is why abstracting from capital accumulation in the present analysis seemed a sensible
(and parsimonious) choice. It should be noted, however, that the main theoretical re-
sults concerning complementarity and substitutability between prices and flows extend
to production economies. Corsetti et al. (2008a) show that in a setup featuring capi-
tal accumulation, the income effect of price changes prevails over the substitution effect
for low values of the trade elasticity. The prevalence of the income effect would imply
substitutability between prices and flows and is likely to give rise to optimal “upstream”
flows.
The results on complementarity and substitutability would apply also to frameworks
featuring deviations from the law of one price (LOOP). Yet, the presence of frictions in
goods markets would affect the relative strength of the two effects, changing the relevant
threshold for the trade elasticity (τ˜). For instance, consider a setup in which the LOOP
holds at the producer but not at the consumer level. This would be the case, for instance,
if deviations were due to the presence of distribution services intensive in local inputs.
Consumer prices would respond less to fluctuations in the terms of trade (as measured
at the producer level) with respect to a setup without deviations from the LOOP, so
that the substitution effect is going to be lower. For the same reason, also income effects
would be reduced. The net impact of LOOP deviations on the relative strength of the two
effects would be in principle ambiguous. Therefore, the threshold of the trade elasticity
that determines complementarity and substitutability may be higher or lower due to
deviations from the LOOP.36 The same would be true if LOOP deviations were due to
optimal pricing-to-market and applied also at the wholesale level. This would be the case if
variable distribution costs make the markup charged by domestic firms at home differ from
the markup charged in the foreign market. Even absent price rigidities, the expenditure
33The definition of the transfer problem dates back to the 1920s when Keynes argued that the war
reparations imposed on Germany after the First World War would have represented an excessive burden
for the country. At the roots of the argument, there was the worry that transferring resources abroad
would have moved international prices against Germany, raising the real cost of reparations.
34Contributions focusing on long-run effects comprise Obstfeld and Rogoff (1994), Broner et al. (1998),
and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008).
35This would be the case, for instance, in a model with trade in bonds.
36For a formal derivation of income and substitution effects in this setup, see Corsetti et al. (2008a).
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switching motive of nominal exchange rate changes would be lower with respect to a model
without pricing-to-market. Also in this setup, the effect of deviations from LOOP on the
relative strength of substitution and income effect would be in principle ambiguous. A
rise in the price of the domestic variety would give rise to a lower substitution effect,
as foreign firms would lower the export price of their product less than proportionally to
nominal exchange rate changes. At the same time, the optimal markup charged abroad by
domestic firms would be smaller, which would dampen the income effect of price changes.
Again, the net effect is likely to depend on the structure of the full-fledged model and its
calibration.37 As an aside, it is interesting to notice that in the presence of distribution
costs we would not need to assume strong complementarity among varieties in consumers’
preferences, in order to generate a low trade elasticity and thus substitutability.
Although the present analysis abstracts from nominal price rigidities, the main results
on complementarity and substitutability are likely to go through in frameworks featuring
price stickiness. See Corsetti et al. (2008b) and (2010) for the analysis of a production
economy with trade in uncontingent bonds in which nominal price rigidities make prices
sticky in local currency.38 In this model, a positive productivity shock in either the
tradable or the nontradable goods sector might result in an appreciation of the terms of
trade. For a low trade elasticity this is made possible by an income effect that overcomes
the substitution effect of price changes, implying substitutability between prices and flows.
Whether the relevant threshold for the trade elasticity is increased or decreased relative
to the benchmark case might again be a calibration issue.
8 Concluding remarks
A large body of literature has investigated the impact of financial market integration
on international insurance. These tests are based on the presumption that risk-sharing
requires financial markets to channel resources to countries that (absent asset trade)
would be made relatively poorer by national shocks, net of physical capital accumulation.
This condition of efficiency for financial markets is derived focusing on only one of the
two channels of international insurance, cross-border financial flows, and assuming no
interaction between this and the second channel, relative price fluctuations.
Against this literature, this paper shows that risk-sharing conditions can only be
derived focusing on both channels and accounting for their interaction. In particular,
financial flows and price fluctuations can be complements or substitutes in providing in-
surance, depending on the response of the price of a country’s output to financial inflows
from abroad. While complementarity implies the standard condition of efficiency, sub-
stitutability requires well-functioning financial markets to channel resources “upstream”,
from poorer to richer countries. These results seem to question the validity of existing
empirical methods based on the “standard efficiency condition”.
The results could also be related to the empirical rejection of the intertemporal ap-
proach to the current account. From a theoretical point of view, several works acknowl-
edged the importance that terms of trade fluctuations may have in shaping current account
dynamics (see e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff (1994)). Yet, most empirical tests of the intertem-
poral theory of the current account abstracted from international price adjustments.39
37This would be the case if monetary policy has real effects. As long as money is neutral, nominal
exchange rate adjustments would not affect the real allocation. The dynamics would coincide with those
described in the previous paragraph, in which deviations from the LOOP affect substitution and income
effects only through consumer prices. See Corsetti et al. (2008b).
38 In that model firms face price adjustment costs á-la Rotemberg (1982).
39Among the other, Feldstein and Horioka (1980), “present value tests” in the spirit of Cambell and
Shiller (1987) and Ghosh (1995), Glick and Rogoff (1995). Chinn and Prasad (2003) find that the impact
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Our theoretical insights seem to open new challenges for the empirical literature dealing
with current account dynamics and risk-sharing sharing measurement.
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A Standard efficiency condition and empirical meth-
ods
According to the “standard efficiency condition”, international financial markets are effi-
cient if, in response to a national income shock, they channel resources to countries that
(absent asset trade) would be made temporarily poorer by the disturbance. This section
shows that this condition is at the basis of virtually every empirical framework measuring
international insurance.40
Sorensen and Yosha (1998) (SY henceforth) assume no relative prices and rely on the
following identity41
C = GDP +NFI −NSAV (28)
where NFI and NSAV denote respectively net financial income and net savings. From
(28), full insurance — C and Y being uncorrelated, according to SY — requires a country
experiencing a negative output shock (getting poorer absent asset trade) to receive income
from abroad (either from portfolio returns or from external borrowing — net of physical
capital accumulation). SY show that the decomposition in (28) allows to quantify the
fraction of output shocks that is absorbed through different risk-sharing channels, by
estimating
−Δ logNFIt ≡ (Δ logGDPt −Δ logGNPt) = αf + βf ·Δ logGDPt + εft (29)
Δ logNSAVt ≡ (Δ logGNPt −Δ logCt) = αs + βs ·Δ logGDPt + εst (30)
Δ logCt = αu + βu ·Δ logGDPt + εut (31)
where βf is interpreted as the fraction of output shock that is absorbed through factor
income flows, βs is the share absorbed through consumption smoothing, and βu the
fraction left uninsured. In a two-country world (29) — (31) are equivalent to42

Δ logNFIjt −Δ logNFIit
	
= αf + βf ·

Δ logGDP it −Δ logGDP
j
t
	
+ εft (32)

Δ logNSAV it −Δ logNSAV
j
t
	
= αs + βs ·

Δ logGDP it −Δ logGDP
j
t
	
+ εst (33)

Δ logCit −Δ logC
j
t
	
= αu + βu ·

Δ logGDP it −Δ logGDP
j
t
	
+ εut (34)
where superscripts denote different countries (or country aggregates). Under the main-
tained assumption of no relative prices, equations (32) — (34) imply the same view of
optimal financial flows underlying (28) and (29) — (31): efficient financial markets should
40Some tests aim only at verifying the null of full risk-sharing or perfectly integrated capital markets.
In these cases, once the null is rejected, it is not clear how to derive implications for the actual degree of
insurance. Most of these empirical frameworks test the equality of expected Stochastic Discount Factors
across countries (Kollmann (1995), Ravn (2001)), and do not rely directly on the standard efficiency
condition.
41Equation (28) implies that consumption and output have the same composition, hence the same price.
42 See Dedola and De Fiore (2005).
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channel resources to the countries that (absent asset trade) would have been made rela-
tively poorer by national shocks. Estimating slopes in the interval [0, 1) signals a relatively
high degree of insurance. Instead, βu > 1, βf < 0, and βs < 0 indicate that financial mar-
kets are highly inefficient, as they channel resources to relatively richer countries. Kalemli-
Ozcan et al. (2004) estimate βf < 0 among European countries during the Nineties, and
interpret this finding as signaling bad insurance from cross-border ownership of securities.
Under the assumption of no relative price fluctuations Obstfeld (1993) also derive an
empirical framework in the form43
Δ logCit = α+ β ·Δ logCjt + γ ·Δ logGDP jt + εt
which underlies the same view of efficient financial markets as the methodology of SY.
Both methods — adopted subsequently by a large body of followers — are based on the
optimal pattern of financial flows described by the “standard efficiency condition”.
This paper questions the validity of the “standard efficiency condition” in a setup in
which relative prices (realistically) fluctuate in response to cross-border financial flows.
It finds that this condition gives only a partial representation of the optimal pattern of
financial flows. The main implications for existing empirical frameworks relying on the
“standard efficiency condition” are the following. First, if relative prices are well-defined,
identity (28) should be modified to take into account price fluctuations. Several refine-
ments to the SY and Obstfeld approach have implemented this change, mainly deflating
national output with the local CPI, so as to express all variables in terms of the coun-
try’s consumption.44 However — the second implication — once output is properly deflated,
the theoretical results of the present paper apply: efficient financial markets can make
resources flow “upstream”, from relatively poorer to relatively richer countries. That is,
estimating βf < 0 in (32) (with output properly deflated, as found by Kalemli-Ozcan et
al. (2004)), or βu > 1 in (34) can indicate an optimal outcome and may signal a high
degree of insurance. Intuitively, a negative GDP shock may optimally lead to an even
larger fall in relative consumption, provided it is compensated by an appreciation of the
real exchange rate. In other words, a country’s wealth may be insulated from GDP fluc-
tuations if a fall in its consumption is compensated by a strengthening of its currency. In
this sense, the proper regression to run would be (see Viani (2010b) for further details
and an empirical application of this method)

Δ logCit −Δ logC
j
t
	
− Δ logQt
ρ
≡ gap
i,j
t
ρ
= α+ β ·

Δ logGDP it −Δ logGDP
j
t
	
+ εt
B Measure of insurance and welfare
This section is devoted to prove that in the DSGE model used in this paper, there exists
a monotone relationship between the gap and the social welfare losses due to imperfect
43This regression is analogous to (31) in SY, but does not impose a unitary coefficient on country j
consumption.
44 See for example Sorensen and Yosha (1998), Del Negro (2000), and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2004).
If relative prices are well-defined, identity (28) becomes
C =
Py ·GDP
P
+NFI −NSAV
where P and Py are respectively the prices of consumption and output, and I have assumed that net
financial income and net savings are expressed in terms of real consumption. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2004)
motivate the need for this adjustment in footnote (36).
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insurance. I will show that the higher the gap that opens up at time t, the higher the
deviation of the time-t allocation from the optimum of a social welfare function that
weights the two countries according to their previous wealth.
Consider the model outlined in section 3. The first-best plan that delivers the max-
imum social welfare attainable in this model can be characterized as the outcome of a
Social Planner maximization. The Social Planner must allocate consumption between the
two countries and weights them symmetrically. She solves the following problem
max . : E0
 ∞
t=0
Ωβt
(Ct)
1− ρ
1−ρ
+ (1− Ω)βt (C

t )
1− ρ
1−ρ

(35)
s.t. : Ct =

(δ)1/θ (Cht)
θ−1
θ + (1− δ)1/θ (Cft)
θ−1
θ
 θ
θ−1
(36)
Ct =

(δ)1/θ

Cft
 θ−1
θ + (1− δ)1/θ (Cht)
θ−1
θ
 θ
θ−1
(37)
Yt = Cht + C

ht
Y t = Cft + C

ft
where Ω = (1− Ω). In what follows μt and μt denote the multipliers attached to the CES
bundle constraints (equations (36) and (37)), that is the shadow value of consumption,
respectively, in the H and in the F country. In the decentralized problem whose solu-
tion coincides with the Social Planner allocation, the ratio

μ

t
μt
	
corresponds to the real
exchange rate Qt. The first order conditions with respect to Ct and Ct read
Ω · (Ct)−ρ = μt (38)
(1− Ω) · (Ct )−ρ = μt (39)
The sequence of equations (38) and (39) evaluated at t = 0, ...,∞ characterizes the first-
best plan that (by construction) delivers the maximum social welfare attainable in this
economy, that is the sequence of allocations that maximizes the Social Welfare function
in (35). In particular, equations (38) and (39) identify the time-t allocation that is part of
this plan. The first-best allocations may coincide with the ones attained in a decentralized
model with complete asset markets. In particular, in order for the Planner’s solution to
correspond to a complete-markets decentralized allocation, the Planner’s weights Ω and
(1− Ω) should represent countries’ relative wealth at time t = −1 determined by the
initial conditions C−1, C−1, μ−1, and μ

−1.
45
In economies in which asset markets are incomplete (or effectively incomplete) the
Planner’s first order conditions (38) and (39) need not hold with equality. Assume that
the incomplete market allocations coincide with the first-best plan from t = 0 up to
time (t− 1), but at time t an idiosyncratic shock makes the incomplete market allocation
deviate from the benchmark one. In this case
Ω · CIMt
−ρ · ϕt = μIMt (40)
(1− Ω) · CIMt
−ρ · ϕt = μIMt (41)
45 See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 42 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1038
where ϕ and ϕ represent the wedge between marginal utility of consumption and CPI
created by the shock, and the IM superscript denotes the incomplete markets allocation.
Loglinearizing (40) and (41) around a symmetric Steady State with full risk-sharing gives
ϕˆt = μˆ
IM
t + ρcˆ
IM
t
ϕˆt = μˆ
IM
t + ρcˆ
IM
t
Notice that if the shock is purely idiosyncratic, ϕˆt and ϕˆ

t must have opposite signs (if ϕˆt
is positive, ϕˆt must be negative and viceversa).
46 The incomplete markets gap coincides
with the difference between ϕˆt and ϕˆt
gapIMt = qˆ
IM
t − ρ

cˆIMt − cˆIMt

= ϕˆt − ϕˆt
The opposite sign of ϕˆt and ϕˆt is sufficient to ensure that a higher gap (in absolute value)
must be generated by an incomplete markets allocation implying higher wedges between
marginal utilities of consumption and CPIs, therefore a higher deviation from the Social
Planner’s (logged) optimality conditions (38) and (39). Due to the concavity of the Social
Welfare function in (35) as a sum of concave functions, a higher deviation from the Social
Planner’s focs maps into a lower social welfare. Therefore, the higher the gap that arises
in response to shocks in any incomplete markets setup, the higher the loss in social welfare
caused by the disturbance with respect to the full risk-sharing benchmark.
C Appendix C: Proofs to the Propositions
C.1 Proposition 1
Proof. Introduce an exogenous transfer of resources in H and F budget constraints
CtPt = PhtYht − PtTt Ct P t = PftYft +
Pt
P t
Tt (42)
The linearized model is solved around the symmetric Steady State in which T = 0.47
The response of the terms of trade, the relative price of the F good, totˆ, to a marginal
flow Tˆt is given by
totˆt =
2δ
(1− δ) (2δθ − 2δ + 1) · Tˆt
This implies
∂tot
∂T
> 0 ⇐⇒ θ > τ˜
C.2 Proposition 2
Proof. Introduce an exogenous transfer of resources in H and F budget constraints. From
the Proof to Proposition 1
totˆt =
2δ
(1− δ) (2δθ − 2δ + 1) · Tˆt
46 If this was not the case, one of the resource constraints would be violated.
47 In equation (42) I have assumed that the resources transferred are marginal units of the H consumption
bundle. However, this assumption is unconsequential for the results. Since at the approximation point
T = 0, it does not matter which good is transferred across countries.
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From the solution to the system linearized around the symmetric Steady State with
T = 0
cˆt = (δ − 1) · totˆt − Tˆt =


−2 δ
2δθ − 2δ + 1 − 1

· Tˆt
cˆt = (1− δ) · totˆt + Tˆt =


2
δ
2δθ − 2δ + 1 + 1

· Tˆt
qˆt = (2δ − 1) · totˆt = −


2δ
2δ − 1
(δ − 1) (2δθ − 2δ + 1)

· Tˆt
Combining the solution for H and F consumption and the real exchange rate yields
gapt = qˆt − ρ (cˆt − cˆt ) =
2ρδ (δ − 1) + ρ (2δθ − 2δ + 1) (δ − 1)− δ (2δ − 1)
(2δθ − 2δ + 1) (δ − 1) · Tˆt (43)
For θ > τ˜ , (2δθ − 2δ + 1) > 0. Both numerator and denominator in equation (43) are
negative for 0.5 < δ < 1. A marginal transfer to F consumers raises the gap, their relative
wealth.
For θ < τ˜ , the denominator in (43) is positive. The numerator is negative for ρ >
0, δ > 0, θ > 0. A flow to the F country lowers the relative wealth of its inhabitants.
C.3 Proposition 3
Proof. Assume the system is in Steady State up to time (t− 1) and assume an increase
in the supply of the H good at time t. The bonds purchased by H consumers in response
to the disturbance (coinciding with the borrowing of F agents) are given by
bˆt = −bˆt =

(δ − 1) (ζ − 1)
4δ − 4δ2 + 4δ2ρθ − 4δρθ − 1

(ζβ − 1)

!   "
>0
· {2δρθ − 2δ − ρ+ 1}!   "
>0⇐⇒ θ>η˜
· εHt (44)
It is easy to verify that the term in square brackets is positive for all δ < 1, θ > 0, ζ < 1.
What determines whether F consumers borrow or lend is the position of the trade elasticity
relative to the efficiency threshold η˜ — which pins down the sign of the term in braces.
For θ > η˜, gapFA < 0 (from equation (16) — the relative wealth of Foreign consumers
would fall in Financial autarky) and bˆt < 0 (from (44)). For τ˜ < θ < η˜, gap
FA > 0 and
bˆt > 0. Thus, if prices and flows are complements (θ > τ˜) the F country imports resources
through external borrowing if and only if the shock would have made it relatively poorer
absent asset trade.
For θ < τ˜ , gapFA < 0 and bˆt > 0. If prices and flows are substitutes, F consumers (the
relatively poorer ones absent asset trade) export resources through financial markets.
C.4 Proposition 4
Proof. In the full solution to the system (26), the portfolio flow received by Foreign
consumers (ξ) after an exogenous increase in the H endowment is given by
ξt = −ξt =

(δ − 1)
(ζβ − 1) (4δ(δ − 1)(θρ− 1)− 1)

!   "
(+)
{2δρθ − ρ− 2δ + 1}!   "
>0⇐⇒ θ>η˜
· εht (45)
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It is easy to verify that the term in brackets is positive ∀δ < 1, ζ < 1,β < 1. What
determines if Foreign consumers receive an inflow from optimal portfolio returns after a
windfall in the Home country, is the position of the trade elasticity relative to the efficiency
threshold η˜ — which pins down the sign of the term in braces.
For θ > η˜, gapFA < 0 (from equation (16) the relative wealth of Foreign consumers
would fall in Financial autarky) and ξt > 0 (from equation (45)). For τ˜ < θ < η˜,
gapFA > 0 and ξt < 0. Thus, if prices and flows are complements (θ > τ˜) the F country
receives resources through portfolio returns if and only if the shock would have made it
relatively poorer absent asset trade.
For θ < τ˜ , gapFA < 0 and ξt < 0. If prices and flows are substitutes, F consumers
(the relatively poorer ones absent asset trade) export resources through financial markets.
C.5 Proposition 5
Proof. From the solution to the first step of the DS method we can retrieve the impact
on the smoothing gap (gapSM , the first element of the right hand side of equation (27))
of a marginal flow of resources to Foreign consumers via portfolio returns (ξt , equivalent
to −ξt in equation (25)).48
∂gapSM
∂ξ
=

(4δ(δ − 1)(1− θρ) + 1) (β − 1)
(δ − 1)

·

1
2δθ − 2δ + 1

> 0 ⇐⇒
⇐⇒ (2δθ − 2δ + 1) > 0 ⇐⇒ θ < τ˜
Receiving a marginal transfer of resources through portfolio returns raises the relative
wealth of Foreign consumers (the gap) if and only if the trade elasticity is above the
transmission threshold τ˜ , that is if and only if prices and flows are complements.
Optimal portfolio returns should counterbalance gapSM , in order to reduce the equi-
librium gap to zero (from (27)).
For θ > η˜, gapSM < 0 (from equation (22)) and ∂gap
SM
∂ξ > 0. For τ˜ < θ < η˜,
gapSM > 0 and ∂gap
SM
∂ξ > 0. Thus, if prices and flows are complements (θ > τ˜) the F
country should receive resources through portfolio returns if and only if the shock would
have made it relatively poorer absent portfolios (in the smoothing allocation).
For θ < τ˜ , gapSM < 0 and ∂gap
SM
∂ξ < 0. If prices and flows are substitutes, portfo-
lio returns should subtract resources to F consumers (the relatively poorer ones in the
smoothing allocation).
C.6 Proposition 6
Proof. Consider the second step of the DS method. In equilibrium, optimal cross-border
flows arise endogenously from variations in assets excess returns and Steady State gross
portfolio positions. Namely
ξt = −ξt = rxtα
where α are the gross Steady State holdings of H consumers of the H equity (α ≡ Z ·
(1− Sh) , where Z is the H security’s price in Steady State). Notice that, by definition, α
is the share of the H commodity that H consumers buy in excess of what they receive as
endowment. Linearized excess returns of the H equity with respect to the F stock read
rxt ≡ (rˆt − rˆt ) = (1− β) (yˆht − yˆft)− (1− β)tott + β (zˆt − zˆt )−

zˆt−1 − zˆt−1

48 In the first step of the DS method ξ is an i.i.d. shock. It is sufficient to combine the appropriate
vectors of the solution to get the impact of a marginal transfer to F consumers on the gap.
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A depreciation of the terms of trade in response to an increase the H endowment, tends
to lower the relative returns from the H equity. If the trade elasticity is low, relative price
volatility is high and offsets the positive impact on excess returns of an increase in the
relative quantity of the H good. In this case excess returns from the H equity tend to fall
after a rise in the H endowment. From the analytical solution for rxt, it is possible to
show that an increase in the H endowment raises the excess returns on the H equity only
for
θ > φ˜ ≡ 4δ (δ − 1)− ρ+ 1
4δρ (δ − 1) > η˜
The optimal gross position (α) is the one that, combined with the endogenous response
to shocks of asset excess returns (rxt), generates the optimal cross-border flows described
in Proposition 4. The following graph represents along the domain of the trade elasticity,
the response to an increase in the H endowment of the excess returns on the H equity
(rx); the direction of optimal resource transfers (from Proposition 5); and H agents’ gross
holdings of the H equity (α, computed through the DS method).
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FIGURE 10
Response of H excess returns, optimal direction of portfolio
flows, and optimal gross holdings (α), as a function of θ
For θ < η˜, following a positive shock to the H endowment, portfolio returns should
channel resources to H consumers. Due to the low degree of substitutability between
varieties, the strong depreciation of the terms of trade lowers the relative return on the
H stock. By selling claims to the H endowment (α < 0) H consumers receive an inflow
of resources if their own endowment increases. For η˜ < θ < φ˜, portfolio returns should
transfer resources to Foreign agents. Thus, H households should go long on their own
equity, whose relative return falls: α > 0. For θ > φ˜ F consumers should still receive
a transfer of wealth. The high trade elasticity requires only a small depreciation of the
terms of trade and the relative returns on the H equity rise. H consumers should then
hold claims to the Foreign endowment: α < 0.49
49Notice that φ˜ represents an asymptot for H gross holdings. When the trade elasticity matches φ˜
Home and Foreign equities yield the same returns in response to any shock. The closer the elasticity to
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 46 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1038
The share of the Home equity optimally held by H consumers (Sh) can be easily
computed from their gross holdings α.50
Sh = 1 + (1− δ)

1
4δ (δ − 1) (ρθ − 1) + ρ− 1

!   "
<0⇐⇒ θ>φ˜
· {2δρθ − ρ− 2δ + 1}!   "
>0⇐⇒ θ>η˜
(46)
For θ < η˜, H households sell part of the claims to their own endowment and their portfolio
exhibits home bias (0.5 < Sh < 1).51 For η˜ < θ < φ˜, H agents go long on the Home equity
(Sh > 1), a counterfactual “excessive” home bias. For θ > φ˜, H consumers hold less than
a half of the claims to their own endowment (Sh < 0.5), which gives rise to foreign bias.52
Thus φ˜ represents a foreign bias threshold.53
C.7 Propositions 7 and 8
Proposition 7 Under trade in uncontingent bonds, a marginal flow of resources from
the H to the F country raises the price of the F output (depreciates the terms of trade) if
the trade elasticity is above the transmission threshold τ˜ ; lowers the price of the F output
otherwise.
Proof. Introduce an exogenous transfer of resources in H and F budget constraints
PBt Bt+1 =
PhtYht
Pt
− Ct +Bt − Tt
PBt B

t+1
Qt
=
PftYft
P t
− Ct +
Bt
Qt
+
Tt
Qt
The linearized model is solved around the symmetric Steady State in which B = B =
T = 0. The response of the terms of trade, the relative price of the F good, totˆ to a
marginal flow Tˆt is given by
totˆt = (1− 2δ) (β − 1) · 2δ − βδ + 1
2δ − 2δθ − 1
This implies
∂tot
∂T
> 0 ⇐⇒ θ > τ˜
this threshold, the larger the amount of assets agents need to hold.
50Namely, Sh = 1 + α (1− β).
51The low degree of substitutability between goods implies a high volatility of excess returns. The share
of Foreign equities held by H households does not need to exceed (1/2).
52 Intuitively, Sh is smaller than (1/2) because the high trade elasticity implies a small depreciation of
the terms of trade and a low volatility of excess returns. H consumers must hold a large share of the
Foreign stock in order to hedge optimally.
53This model is very similar to the one analysed in Kollmann (2006). As Kollmann (2006) and Coeur-
dacier (2005) notice, in order for this framework — and in general all models reconducing equity home
bias only to biased consumption expenditures — to generate a realistic degree of equity home bias, the
elasticity of substitution between H and F goods should be sufficiently low. Kollmann finds that when
the elasticity is high enough, still below unity in his calibration, the model delivers a counterfactual "ex-
cessive" home bias in equities (Sh > 1). For an elasticity sufficently above unity, he finds that this kind
of models generates an equally counterfactual foreign bias (Sh < 0.5).
The interpretation of optimal portfolio formation detailed in the text, provides a rationale for foreign
bias and excessive home bias. It shows that only for an elasticity lower than the efficiency threshold, the
model can generate a realistic degree of equity home bias. Thus when prices and flows are substitutes,
equity home bias is consistent with efficient financial markets. Instead complementarity between flows
and prices may well imply “excessive” home bias or foreign bias.
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Proposition 8 A marginal flow of resources from the H to the F country raises the rela-
tive wealth of Foreign consumers if the trade elasticity is above the transmission threshold
τ˜ ; lowers the relative wealth of F consumers otherwise.
Proof. Combining the solution for the response of Ct, Ct , and Qt to a marginal transfer
to the Foreign country, yields
∂gap
∂ξ
=

(4δ(δ − 1)(1− θρ) + 1) (β − 1)
(δ − 1)

·

1
2δθ − 2δ + 1

> 0 ⇐⇒
⇐⇒ (2δθ − 2δ + 1) > 0 ⇐⇒ θ < τ˜
Receiving a marginal transfer of resources through external borrowing raises the relative
wealth of Foreign consumers (the gap) if and only if the trade elasticity is above the
transmission threshold τ˜ .
D Wealth effects with endogenous portfolios
I write consumers’ utility maximization for a general case in which agents can trade in
multiple contingent securities and form a portfolio that hedges them ex-ante — to some
extent — against national shocks. The formulation of the problem abstracts from the degree
of completeness of asset markets. I leave the characterization of portfolios indeterminate.
This allows for the greatest degree of generality, and is sufficient to show that the gap
maps into changes in countries’ relative wealth. It should be clear that the purpose of this
section is not to find optimal portfolios, nor to derive a full solution to the model, but
rather to show that also in the case of trade in multiple contingent assets, the insurance
measure reflects cross-border wealth imbalances.
Assume agents can trade in n assets with state-contingent payoffs rit, i = 1, ..., n, ex-
pressed in H consumption units. For our purposes, payoffs can be generally characterized
as a function of the realization of national shocks at time t. Define αt as the vector of
gross holdings of the first (n− 1) assets purchased by Home consumers at time t. Optimal
portfolios α are not specified, and can be thought of as a function of shock realizations.54
H households’ budget constraint reads
NFAt = r
n
t NFAt−1 +
YhtPht
Pt
− Ct + αt−1rxt!   "
ξt
where NFA are net foreign assets, αt−1 is a function of the realization of shocks Y and
Y  at time (t− 1), rxt = [r1xt, ..., rn−1xt ] is the vector of realized excess returns, and rnt is
the n-th asset payoff. ξt is the transfer of resources delivered at time t by portfolio returns
in response to shocks.55 Since we are not interested in finding the optimal portfolio, we
can abstract from its composition, and write the inter-temporal problem of H consumers
as
max
{Ct,NFAt,νt}
. : L = E0

∞
t=0
βt

(Ct)
1−ρ
1− ρ + νt (Ptr
n
t NFAt−1 + PhtYt + Ptξt − PtCt − PtNFAt)

54 In a full solution to the model and up to a second-order approximation, portfolio composition would
depend both on exogenous shocks and on second and third-order moments. See Devereux and Sutherland
(2006).
55 ξt depends on the realization of the shocks at time t (through asset returns) and (t− 1) (through
αt−1).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 48 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1038
where νt is the shadow value of income at time t, including endowment income, returns
from previous period net foreign assets, and flows from portfolio holdings. As for the
smoothing case analyzed in the main text, it is easy to show that νt represents the shadow
value of the present discounted value of lifetime income. Following the same steps as in
the smoothing case yields
qˆt − ρ (cˆt − cˆt ) ≡ gapt = (νˆt − νˆt )
The wealth imbalances reflected in (νˆt − νˆt ) are residual after portfolio returns have
delivered contingent transfers of resources. When asset markets are effectively complete,
the wealth distribution stays constant in response to any shock, and the multipliers ν and
ν do not vary over time and states.56
56This is clearly the case with a full set of Arrow-Debreu securities. See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004).
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